Many logicians, such as Ibn Rushd the Younger and others, are wary of Ibn Sīnā regarding what he states on these matters of metaphysics and logic. Ibn Rushd states that the position of the earlier philosophers differs from what they have stated. As for the leading authorities before Ibn Sīnā, the accounts of their views are well known to differ from theirs on this matter.

[Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of imagination and judgments of estimation in al-Ishārāt]

The point is that most later thinkers who expressed these views took them from Ibn Sīnā.

Anyone who carefully considers his statements and those of his followers on this subject will find them utterly contradictory and unsound. In his Ishārāt (Pointers)—which is like a Quran to these heretical philosophers—when discussing the premises of syllogisms and propositions in terms of the grounds for assenting to them, he stated:

“The propositions used by those who reason syllogistically and those who proceed similarly fall into four classes: conceded propositions; probable propositions and related types; propositions mistaken for other kinds; and imaginative propositions.”

I say: Imaginative propositions supply the premises of poetic syllogisms, while propositions mistaken for other kinds supply those of sophistical syllogisms. The preceding classes supply the premises of demonstrative, rhetorical, and dialectical syllogisms.

He said: “Conceded propositions are either propositions held as beliefs or assumed propositions. Propositions held as beliefs fall into three classes: those that must be accepted, widely accepted propositions