judgment. If one can be established only after the other, and vice versa, this is an impossible circular dependence.”

Sixth:

It may be said: If by “intelligibles” you mean universal rational knowledge and the like present in the heart, these are not what is being discussed here. We do not accept the judgment of sense perception or imagination alone in such universal rational knowledge. Externally existing entities that cannot be pointed to through sense perception—why do you say that such things exist? This is precisely the point at issue, and we say that its invalidity is self-evident.

Seventh:

It may be said: Estimation and imagination may refer both to what corresponds to reality and to what does not. Examples of the former include a person’s estimation that someone who is his enemy is indeed his enemy, a sheep’s estimation that a wolf intends to eat it, and a person’s mentally picturing something he has seen after it is no longer present. Such estimation and imagination are true, and their propositions are truthful.

As for what does not correspond to reality, an example is a person’s imagining that something exists externally when it has no external existence, and estimating it to be so. Other examples include someone’s estimating that a person who loves him hates him, or estimating that people love and esteem him when the opposite is the case.

“Allah does not love anyone who is conceited and boastful.”

The conceited person imagines himself to be great, thus holding a higher opinion of himself than he deserves. Other examples are of this kind.

They said:

“If that is so, why do you say that the judgment of the innate disposition—that two existing beings must be either spatially separate or spatially coincident—is a judgment of false estimation and imagination? We say that it is a judgment of estimation and imagination that corresponds to reality.