Third:

The claim that the estimative faculty concedes to reason self-evident propositions entailing the existence of a being that cannot be pointed to through sense perception is not admitted.

Fourth:

Even if it is conceded that the premise is dialectical, when the estimative faculty grants reason a premise, reason cannot benefit from that proposition unless it knows it through sound self-evidence. If reason has no means of attaining this, the avenues of knowledge are closed to it. The concession of the estimative faculty merely makes the proposition dialectical, not demonstrative; this alone is of no use in the demonstrative rational sciences.

Fifth:

The claim that the judgment of estimation and imagination is accepted only concerning objects of sense perception, not intelligibles, is valid only if it is established that entities exist in external reality which cannot be known through the senses in any way. This, in turn, can be established only if it is established that external reality contains something that cannot be pointed to through sense perception. Yet this is the very point at issue.

For those who affirm say:

“Nothing exists in external reality except what can be pointed to through sense perception,” or, “No externally existing being can be conceived except in this way.”

If they are told:

“The judgment of estimation and imagination is accepted concerning objects of sense perception, but not intelligibles,”

and by “intelligibles” is meant self-subsisting entities in external reality that cannot be pointed to through sense perception, they reply:

“Invalidating the judgment of the innate disposition, which you have called estimation and imagination, depends on establishing these intelligibles, while establishing them depends on invalidating this