let him hear an address by which He intends something contrary to its apparent meaning, unless He brings the opposing rational argument to his mind.”

When you said to him, “This rests on the principle of good and evil; moreover, the negligence lies with the accountable individual,” as previously explained, you may likewise be told here:

“This rests on the principle of good and evil; moreover, the negligence lies with the accountable individual. For he was negligent in believing that revelatory evidence yields certainty when it does not. Thus, his unqualified certainty about what the Lawgiver’s report signifies was negligence on his part, while he allowed that the Lawgiver might intend by His address something contrary to its apparent meaning.”

If they take another approach—namely, that revelation cannot be invoked as evidence in any theoretical question—and say, “The resurrection and similar matters are necessarily known to be part of the Messenger’s religion, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, just as the obligation of prayer is known,” using this to answer Ibn Sīnā, then this would also provide an answer for the proponents of affirmation. For the affirmation of the divine names, attributes, and acts is necessarily known, as indeed is the affirmation of His being above.

The source of the error is his statement:

“If we were to suppose that a conclusive rational proof established something contrary to what the revelatory evidence indicates.”

It is your admission of this possibility that has led you into these pitfalls. You should therefore have recognized that this supposition must be categorically rejected, and that it is impossible for a conclusive rational proof to contradict revelatory evidence.