Thus, their position is shown to be false, as is their statement: “We reinterpret only what conflicts with conclusive evidence.” Despite the unsoundness of their position, they may explicitly acknowledge its implication: that no knowledge can be derived from revealed texts, as al-Rāzī and others have stated. Yet they do derive knowledge from them, thus contradicting themselves.

Those among them who do not contradict themselves must say: “The Messenger’s reports fall into three categories: whatever is established by independent evidence is accepted as true; whatever is known to conflict with conclusive reason is reinterpreted; and whatever is not known through independent evidence can neither be affirmed nor denied, but remains doubtful, with judgment suspended.”

This is the true substance of their position, which we mentioned earlier. It is known with immediate certainty from the religion of Islam that this contradicts the obligation imposed by the Messenger to believe his reports. In reality, it means setting the Messenger aside from the role entailed by his mission and placing him on the same footing as Abū Hanīfa in relation to al-Shāfi'ī, or Ahmad ibn Hanbal in relation to Mālik, and the like.

[The Thirty-Sixth Argument]

It may be said: When they turn away from scriptural evidence, only two methods remain available to them: either the method of speculative thinkers, consisting of rational arguments based on inference, or the method of the Sufis, consisting of worship and unveiling. And whoever has tried these two