based on reason, and so forth. For if people’s acceptance of his reports as true may depend on such a condition, it may also depend on other conditions of the same kind. All share the same consequence: making acceptance depend on such a condition means that none of his reports can be used to establish knowledge of what he reports.

If they say that everything is subject to reinterpretation except what is known with immediate certainty to have been his intended meaning, the consequence is even more far-reaching. For anyone rejecting a scriptural text can say: “It is not known with immediate certainty that he intended this.” If someone affirming its meaning is entitled to say, “I know with immediate certainty that he intended it,” then someone affirming something that this person disputes is equally entitled to say the same.

Undoubtedly, those who affirm divine highness and the divine attributes regard these as known with immediate certainty from the religion of the Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him. They therefore do not contradict themselves, whereas those who dispute them do. For someone disputing them cannot say anything to other deniers that those who affirm divine highness cannot also say to him. He must therefore accept the same reasoning; otherwise, he contradicts himself, and his position cannot stand before any of the groups. This demonstrates the unsoundness of his position, which is what we sought to establish.

What we have explained is evident in the statements of every group, even those who affirm some attributes but not others. If you examine their statements, you will find no consistent rule governing what is to be reinterpreted and what is not. Rather, their position necessarily implies that everything can be reinterpreted. Thus, they acknowledge only what is known to be established by evidence independent of revelation. Yet they do not allow such a position, nor can they maintain it.