undermining the foundation of revelation”—can validly make this claim only if they acknowledge the truth of revelation in the absence of the opposing argument. This requires them to acknowledge the Messenger’s prophethood, that he uttered these words, and that he intended such-and-such a meaning by them. Otherwise, if they doubt any one of these premises, they have no report from the Messenger through which they can know the disputed proposition even without opposition from reason, let alone when reason opposes it.

As for prophethood:

Anyone who does not know that the Messenger has knowledge of the matter he reports, and that he is protected from saying anything but the truth concerning it, cannot know the truth concerning that matter through his report. Whenever someone allows that the Messenger might lack knowledge of a matter despite reporting it, and that he might err in what he reports about Allah and the Last Day or might lie, his report yields no knowledge for that person. Anyone who regards prophethood as acquired, after the model of the philosophers’ prophet, and holds that a prophet’s distinctive attributes are a faculty through which he acquires knowledge, a faculty through which he exercises control over knowledge, and a faculty that transforms intellectual concepts within his soul into images that are seen and heard—these images then constituting Allah’s angels and His speech, as Ibn Sīnā and his followers among the philosophers maintain—cannot be certain that the Messenger knows what he says and is protected from saying anything but the truth.

How much more so if he says:

“The Messenger may say something despite knowing otherwise.”

Such people cannot possibly acquire knowledge through the Messenger’s report. How, then, can they discuss the opposition between reason and revelation?

Likewise, anyone who does not know that the reports are established cannot discuss whether knowledge of their contents is attained through them.