misleading on the part of Allah Most High, which is impermissible.’

We reply:

This rests on the principle of moral goodness and badness and on the view that something can be incumbent upon Allah—a position we do not hold.

Even if we concede this, why do you say that Allah must bring that rational proof to the accountable person’s mind? The explanation is that Allah Most High would be misleading the accountable person only if He caused him to hear speech which, rationally, He could not intend to mean anything other than what its apparent sense suggests. But that is not the case. When the accountable person hears that apparent meaning, it remains possible that there is a proof contrary to it. If that were so, Allah’s intended meaning in that speech would not be what its apparent sense suggests.

Accordingly, if Allah causes the accountable person to hear that speech, and the person interprets it according to its apparent meaning with certainty despite the possibility we have mentioned, the failing would lie with the accountable person, not with Allah Most High, for the person would have claimed certainty where certainty was unwarranted. Thus, it is established that it does not follow from Allah Most High’s not bringing to the accountable person’s mind