we establish a rational proof for the truth of what the apparent sense of the revealed proof indicates, in which case appealing to revelation becomes superfluous and unnecessary; or we show the arguments of those who deny what the apparent sense of revelation indicates to be unsound. This latter approach is weak, because, as we have explained, the unsoundness of the arguments they have presented does not entail that no opposing argument exists at all.

The only exception would be to say that there is no evidence for these opposing arguments, so they must be ruled out. But we have already shown this method to be unsound. Alternatively, we could establish a conclusive proof that such-and-such a premise does not contradict this text, and that such-and-such another premise does not contradict it either. We would then need to establish a proof that each of these infinitely many premises does not contradict this apparent sense.

It is thus established that certainty cannot be attained that nothing entails anything contrary to the revealed proof. It is also established that the revealed proof’s ability to yield certainty depends on this. Therefore, its ability to yield certainty depends on a premise that is not certain, namely, the absence of a proof