[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

I say:

The aim here is not to discuss his examples exhaustively. Some of the things he describes as knowable only through revelation can be known without revelation, since a person has several ways of knowing that certain contingent things exist besides being informed by the Messenger. Likewise, what he says cannot be known through revelation calls for discussion, but this is not the place for it.

Rather, the aim is to cite what he says next:

“Once you understand this, we say: It is evident that revealed proofs may not be used in fundamental matters belonging to the first category; otherwise, circular reasoning would result. It is likewise evident that they must be used in the second category, as explained above. As for the third category, whether revealed proofs may be used in it presents a difficulty.

“For if we suppose that a conclusive rational proof establishes something contrary to what the apparent sense of a revealed proof suggests, there is no disagreement among discerning scholars that the revealed proof must be reinterpreted. For if it is impossible to reconcile the apparent sense of