rational evidence; as explained above, this entails that nothing in the words of Allah and His Messenger can be used as evidence. Thus, they are left with neither reason nor revelation.

What we have stated—that this principle precludes using the words of Allah and His Messenger as evidence in theoretical questions—has been acknowledged by their most accomplished thinkers. Indeed, some later theologians, such as al-Rāzī, have accepted this consequence, just as the heretical philosophers have.

The Muʿtazilites, however, do not say that revelatory evidence cannot yield certainty. Rather, they say that revelation cannot be cited as evidence in questions of divine unity and justice, because—as they claim—knowing that the Messenger is truthful depends on knowing these matters.

Likewise, later Ashʿarīs classify discussion of the divine attributes among the rational foundations. As for al-Ashʿarī and the leading scholars among his followers, they regard revelation as admissible evidence against them, just as reason is.

[Al-Rāzī’s discussion of revelatory evidence in Nihāyat al-maʿqūl]

Thus, when Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Rāzī discussed the fundamental forms of evidence that his followers and others employ concerning the foundations of religion, he mentioned this principle and raised objections to it. He said in Nihāyat al-maʿqūl:

“Chapter Seven: Refuting the Weak Methods, of Which There Are Four.”

He mentioned denying something because there is no evidence for it, analogical reasoning, and arguments based on an opponent’s own commitments.

Then he said:

“The fourth is reliance on revelatory evidence. We say: The questions to be established fall into three categories. Some cannot be known through