If it is said:

“We are certain that the Messenger is truthful in everything he reports and that he reports only the truth. However, if something transmitted from the Messenger is cited against what we believe, that counter-evidence is open to challenge, either in its chain of transmission or in its text.

“We may say that the report has not been established, if its authenticity is not known, as with non-mass-transmitted reports and reports transmitted from earlier prophets.

“Alternatively, we may challenge the text by saying that the wording does not establish the speaker’s intended meaning with certainty, but only with probability, either concerning the disputed matter or more generally. Thus, we do not doubt the Messenger’s truthfulness, but rather the transmitter’s truthfulness or whether the transmitted wording conveys his intended meaning.”

The reply is:

This excuse is invalid here for several reasons.

First, you may be asked: Suppose you know that the Messenger intended this meaning—whether you know his intent with inescapable certainty, just as it is known with inescapable certainty that he brought monotheism, the five daily prayers, and the resurrection, or through other evidence established by reasoning—and you have what you regard as a conclusive rational proof contradicting what you know he intended. What would you do?

If you say, “We give precedence to reason,” this entails the previously mentioned invalidation of the reason that establishes the Messenger’s truthfulness, together with unbelief and denial of the Messenger.

If you say, “We give precedence to the Messenger’s words,” you invalidate your previously stated claim: “Reason is the foundation of transmitted revelation, so what rests upon that foundation cannot be given precedence over it.”

And if you say, “Sound reason cannot conflict with such revealed evidence, because we know the Messenger’s intent with certainty,”