of the agent’s existence, and does not entail that the agent is not a body. Nor does the method of inference from the agent’s knowledge entail this, unlike the three preceding methods.

Once this is clear, one may say:

If we establish the Maker’s existence through this method—which you acknowledge can establish the Maker’s existence and the truthfulness of His messengers—and nothing in it entails that the agent is not a body, then the scriptural proofs affirming Allah’s attributes and acts contain nothing that contradicts this method. For the most those who deny them can say is that affirming these acts and attributes, or some of them, entails that the one possessing these attributes and performing these acts is a body, whereas establishing the Maker’s existence rests upon the proof that denies His being a body. Thus, if we accepted what the texts entail, giving them precedence over the rational proof that denies His being a body, we would have given revelation precedence over its own rational foundation.

But once it is clear that establishing the truth of revelation—which rests upon establishing the Maker’s existence and the Messenger’s truthfulness—does not depend upon denying that He is a body, it is self-evident that revelation’s affirmation of the attributes and acts does not contradict the rational proof by which its truth was established. This invalidates the claim that the scriptural proof affirming these attributes and acts may conflict with its rational foundation, which denies them. This is plain and clear, and all praise belongs to Allah.

[Objection: If it conflicts with the rational proof by which the truth of revelation is known]

If they say:

“Granted that this rational proof, by which the truth of revelation is known, is not contradicted by the scriptural proof affirming the attributes and acts; nevertheless, other rational proofs are incompatible with that affirmation”—

the response would be made in several ways: