and grammarians; each of these groups knows with inescapable certainty things about the intent of the leading authorities in its discipline that others do not know at all, let alone know with inescapable certainty or through reasoning.

Since this is so, someone closely acquainted with the Messenger, with greater knowledge of his words, deeds, and purposes, knows with inescapable certainty things about his intent that others do not know. If it is deemed possible for someone who acquires this knowledge with inescapable certainty to have a conclusive rational proof contradicting what these people know with such certainty, this would entail a conflict between knowledge acquired through reasoning and knowledge acquired with inescapable certainty, with precedence given to the former. It is well known that this is invalid.

It thus becomes clear that their claim entails contradictions on their part, the invalidity of their doctrines, and denial of the messengers, with the resulting unbelief and ignorance. It also entails giving precedence to knowledge acquired through reasoning over knowledge acquired with inescapable certainty. This, in turn, entails sophistry that negates both kinds of knowledge.

[Fifth]

Fifth:

Evidence whose validity is conditional upon the absence of conflicting evidence cannot be conclusive, because conclusive evidence cannot be opposed by evidence establishing its contrary. Thus, reason would not establish the truth of anything conveyed by revelation. At most, what the Messenger has reported would be considered probably true.

In that case, your statement, “Reason and transmitted revelation conflict,” is false, because, in your view, reason is conclusive whereas revelation is only probable. It is well known that there is no conflict between what is conclusive and what is merely probable.