Once it becomes clear that the rational proof by which the validity of revelation is known entails both knowledge of its validity and its being established in reality; that our knowledge of revelation entails knowledge of the rational proof said to be its foundation, upon which knowledge of its validity is said to depend; and that revelation’s being established in itself does not entail that particular rational proof’s being established in reality—it follows that revelation is more firmly established in reality than its rational proof. Revelation is also more firmly established in our knowledge than its rational proof, if it is maintained that its validity can be known by means other than that proof. Otherwise, knowledge of the one and knowledge of the other are mutually inseparable.

If this is so, impugning revelation means impugning the rational proof that demonstrates its validity, but not vice versa. Thus, impugning revelation means impugning this particular reasoning, whereas impugning this reasoning does not necessarily mean impugning revelation as such.

As for rational considerations other than those demonstrating the validity of revelation, their invalidity likewise does not entail the invalidity of revelation, just as their validity does not entail its validity.

It is therefore clear that no rational consideration must be given precedence over revelation on the grounds that it is revelation’s foundation. For if what is given precedence is not the rational consideration that demonstrates revelation’s validity, it is not its foundation, and there is no obligation to give it precedence on that basis. If it is the rational consideration that demonstrates revelation’s validity, it cannot be valid while revelation is invalid, because its validity entails the validity of revelation; otherwise, it would not constitute proof of it.

For what entails something cannot hold without that entailment. Thus, whoever gives reason precedence over revelation has