First:
If he does not know with inescapable certainty that the Messenger reported it, then, according to your position, it is not known to be established. Accordingly, if he finds probabilistic evidence favoring its negation, he asserts the conclusion they entail, even while allowing that someone else may know their contrary with inescapable certainty.

Second:
Conclusive rational proofs are neither a category clearly distinguished from other proofs nor something upon which rational people agree. Rather, every group of speculative thinkers claims to possess a conclusive proof for its position, while another group says that this proof is invalid and that its invalidity is known through reason. Indeed, the latter may claim to possess a conclusive proof for the opposite of the former group’s position. If rational arguments are neither clearly distinguishable nor agreed upon, and their proponents allow themselves to give them precedence over reports from the Messenger whenever they do not know those reports with inescapable certainty, it follows that each of them may deny something that another knows with inescapable certainty the Messenger reported.

It is well known that knowledge acquired with inescapable certainty is the foundation of knowledge acquired through reasoning. If a person allows that something another knows with inescapable certainty may be false, he allows that such knowledge may be false. If it is invalidated, knowledge acquired through reasoning is likewise invalidated. Their position thus entails the invalidation of all knowledge. Besides entailing that they have no knowledge of what they assert, it involves their own inconsistency and sophistry in its most extreme form.”

If they say:

“We affirm whatever we know with inescapable certainty that the Messenger intended ن, and we do not allow that reason could contain anything contradicting it. But we do not affirm what others know, and we allow that reason may contain