the prophets yield knowledge that what they report is true. Whoever allows that there may, in reality, be countervailing evidence negating what their reports establish cannot know anything on the basis of their reports. For whenever they report something whose truth he has not established through his own reason, he allows that there may, in reality, be evidence contradicting it. Thus, he gains no knowledge of what they report through their reports themselves, and so does not acknowledge their prophethood. Nor does he possess any knowledge acquired through scriptural reports alone.

Yet they have acknowledged that knowledge is of three kinds: that which is acquired through scriptural reports alone, that which is acquired through reason alone, and that which is acquired through both.

Moreover, conclusive rational proofs have established the prophethood of the prophets and that they may acquire their knowledge through communications from Allah and His angels: sometimes through speech they hear from Allah, as Moses, son of ʿImrān, heard; sometimes through angels conveying messages to them from Allah; and sometimes through revelation that Allah imparts. As the Most High says:

“It is not for any human being that Allah should speak to him except by revelation, or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger who reveals, by His permission, whatever He wills.” [al-Shūrā: 51]

It thus becomes clear that their allowing the possibility of evidence that contradicts scriptural reports entails that, in reality, there can be no scriptural proof through which its reported content is known. This exposes their inconsistency: they affirm scriptural proofs, then say what entails their invalidation; they affirm rational proofs, then say what entails contradicting them. For it is through reason that the validity of scriptural proofs is known. If those proofs are invalidated, the rational proof establishing the validity of scriptural reports is likewise invalidated. A proof entails what it proves, and whenever