And prophethood itself entails the communication of reports, for nubuwwa (prophethood) is derived from inbā’ (informing), which means reporting matters unseen. A prophet reports what is hidden and informs us of the unseen. No sound proof can establish that everything the prophets have reported can be known without such reports. Thus, one cannot categorically assert that everything the prophets have reported is nonexistent.

No proof can establish this sweeping denial, nor can anyone maintain that everything the prophets have reported can be known by others without their reports. Accordingly, the communities with the most complete knowledge are those that acknowledge sense perception, reason, and reports as means of acquiring knowledge. Whoever rejects any of these means misses out on knowledge in proportion to what he rejects.

Those adherents of philosophy who affirmed prophethood in a manner consistent with their unsound principles—such as Ibn Sīnā and his like—did not acknowledge that the prophets acquire knowledge through reports coming to them from Allah, whether conveyed by an angel or otherwise. Rather, they claimed that the prophets acquire this knowledge through an intellectual faculty, because their faculty of intuition is more perfect than that of others. They call this the “holy faculty,” and confined the prophets’ knowledge to it.

Their position amounted, in reality, to saying that the prophets are of the same kind as other people and that they learned nothing through reports. Consequently, these philosophers derive no knowledge from the prophets’ reports. Instead, they say that the prophets addressed people through imaginative representations for the benefit of the public. Their position amounts, in reality, to saying that the prophets lied