are those that are equal in all intrinsic attributes, then, if two things differ in one respect, they are not alike in every respect, since likeness in every respect cannot coexist with difference in any respect.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Comment]

I say:

This rests on a principle they adopted from the Muʿtazilah: that substances and bodies are alike, unlike accidents, which may differ or be alike.

What this position actually means is that bodies are alike in every respect, without differing in any respect. Thus, snow is like fire in every respect, earth is like gold in every respect, and bread is like iron in every respect, since, according to them, each pair shares the same intrinsic attributes.

This view contradicts sense perception and reason so plainly that there is no need to refute its proponent at length. Indeed, the very claim that bodies are alike is among the most untenable positions. Rather, the same account applies to the likeness and difference of bodies as to the likeness and difference of accidents: they are sometimes alike and sometimes different.

Their distinction between intrinsic attributes and attributes arising from inhering qualities that necessarily belong to a particular entity resembles the logicians’ distinction between essential attributes and attributes necessarily belonging to an essence. Both distinctions are unsound and have no basis in reality; indeed, their position is even less tenable than that of the logicians.

If the discussion concerns a body in the abstract or a substance in the abstract, neither exists in external reality. But if it concerns bodies that actually exist, such as fire and water