His statement is false. Although He—glory be to Him—has no equal among things in any respect, reason establishes that any two things share what is meant by “thing,” any two existing beings share what is meant by “existence,” and any two entities share what is meant by “entity.” Thus, you may say that a thing, an existing being, or an entity is divided into eternal and originated, necessary and contingent, Creator and created; the subject of the division extends across these categories.

We have discussed this question at length elsewhere and explained the error of those who regard the term as shared in wording alone.

What Imam Ahmad drew attention to—that what is meant by “thing,” “existence,” and similar terms is a general, universal meaning shared by all things and all existing beings—is established by clear reason and acknowledged by people of reason generally.

Anyone who disputes this must nevertheless affirm it, thereby contradicting himself. Such contradictions occur in the statements of al-Shahrastānī, al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and others. At times, they treat it as a general concept admitting division, shared among existing things in both wording and meaning; at other times, they treat it as shared in wording alone. It would then resemble the word mushtarī, used both for a buyer and for a planet; Suhayl, used both for a star and for a man named Suhayl; and Thurayyā, used both for a star and for a woman named Thurayyā.

As the poet said:

O you who wed Thurayyā to Suhayl—
May Allah grant you long life! How can the two meet?
When she rises, she is toward Syria;
When Suhayl rises, he is toward Yemen.