Thus, the statements of the Jahmiyyah described by Imam Ahmad and other scholars of the early generations are also the statements of those who agree with them among the Qarmatian esotericists and the philosophers who follow Aristotle, such as Ibn Sīnā and others who maintain that He is absolute existence, or existence qualified by negations, and similar notions. This is, in essence, the doctrine of those who profess the unity of existence.

This is why he reported that they denied Him everything that distinguishes one existing thing from another: attributes, actions, and everything particular to an existing thing.

When they said, “He is a thing unlike other things,” the imams understood their intent. Two existing things must share what is meant by “thing.” If they had absolutely nothing in common, it would follow that they could not both exist. This is something known through reason.

Hence Imam Ahmad said, “We said, ‘People of reason know that a thing that is like other things is nothing.’” He thus made clear that this is known through reason and evident rational truths.

This is why Jahm’s well-known statement, widely transmitted from him, was that Allah is not to be called a “thing,” because, he claimed, this would entail likening Him to creation. For if the term “thing” is applied to both the Creator and the created, they necessarily share what it denotes; and this, he claimed, constitutes likening the two.