is the existence of creation; thus they contradict themselves.

Jahm ibn Safwān then answered them much as Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, and other Peripatetic philosophers answered the naturalists among them. These philosophers affirm an intelligible existence distinct from sensible existence, and believe that this response refutes the others’ position. Ibn Sīnā’s statement has already been quoted above, where he discussed existence and its causes, saying:

“People may be strongly inclined to suppose that whatever exists is perceptible to the senses.”

He refuted this view by establishing the existence of universals. Yet the invalidity of this argument has already been pointed out: universals exist in minds, not in external reality.

Someone who acknowledges only what is perceptible to the senses disputes the existence of external entities, not intelligible concepts in the mind. If he also disputes these concepts, establishing their existence proves the point against him. The question of external existents, however, remains—and that is the fundamental issue.

The argument that Ahmad reports Jahm having used against the Sumanis is among the strongest arguments employed by these negationists—both those among them who affirm indwelling and those who deny both indwelling and separation from the world. For these negationists sometimes affirm indwelling, union, or something similar, and at other times say, “He is neither separate from the world nor within it.”

The same individual will sometimes say one thing and sometimes the other, for they are bewildered. The predominant position among their speculative theologians is to deny both, while indwelling predominates among their worshippers, jurists, Sufis, and ordinary followers. Thus their speculative theologians worship nothing, while their Sufis worship everything.