when he reported that they held the term “existence” to be predicated equivocally. This was an error on his part, for he supposed that the universal subject to division exists as something shared in external reality. According to his understanding of the logicians’ statements, this is a principle they hold and which the leading theologians oppose; but his understanding was mistaken.

The point here is that the position of Abū Hāshim and his followers is better than that of Ibn Sīnā. If, however, existence is identical with essence and nothing shared exists in external reality—as al-Ashʿarī and most of those who affirm the divine attributes maintain, and this is the correct position—then this answer is unnecessary.

This does not mean that His essence is absolute, abstract existence, as Ibn Sīnā, Ibn al-Tūmart, and others among the Jahmiyyah maintain. Rather, it means that the reality particular to Him is His particular existence, which is neither absolute nor abstract existence. Likewise, of every existent, one says that its particular reality is its particular existence. We have given this answer on the assumption that His existence is distinct from His essence, because it is useful in addressing the general objections they raise to deny the divine attributes.

[Imam Ahmad’s discussion of the relation of the attributes to the essence of Allah Most High]

Imam Ahmad said:

“Chapter explaining the Jahmiyyah’s denial that Allah spoke to Moses. We said, ‘Why do you deny this?’ They said, ‘Allah has not