by virtue of itself. What we mean when we say that it exists by virtue of itself is that it necessitates its own existence. If you are certain of the distinction on self-evident grounds, our argument in this matter is sound.”

One of his own associates disputed this point, saying: “It is self-evident that, if a cause necessitates existence, it must itself exist, because whatever confers existence must possess existence. The receptive subject, by contrast, receives existence and therefore cannot already exist.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

I say: This confusion arose either from their assertion that His essence produces His existence, or that it is a cause necessitating His existence, on the assumption that His existence is distinct from His essence. There is no need for this. Rather, if His essence is said to be conditioned upon His existence, just as His existence is conditioned upon His essence, and the two are said to be inseparable without either necessitating the other—as they have said concerning the essence and existence of a contingent being—this difficulty disappears.

These thinkers often confuse causes with conditions in discussions of circular dependence, infinite regress, and other matters. They treat that which entails something as its cause, as when they say that the essences of three and four cause oddness and evenness. Thus, they make a thing’s essence the cause of its inseparable attribute, and maintain that the agent producing the essence also produces its attribute. Circular dependence among conditions, in the sense that each of two things depends upon the other’s existence alongside it, is both possible and actual. This is simultaneous, concomitant circular dependence.

Circular dependence among causes, however—where each of two things is the cause of the other and brings it into existence—is impossible by the agreement of all rational people.