And Allah Most High says:

“Who is it that can intercede with Him except by His permission?”
Al-Baqarah: 255.

He also says:

“They do not intercede except for those whom He approves.”
Al-Anbiyā’: 28. There are other similar passages in the Book of Allah, Mighty and Majestic.

There is another response to the underlying argument. One may say: Suppose that two things share something existing in external reality, that each is distinguished from the other by what belongs exclusively to it, and that the universal common to both exists in external reality. Suppose also that one is either a necessary concomitant of the other, has the other as its necessary concomitant, is an attribute of it, or is the bearer of that attribute. Why, then, could the shared element not be a necessary concomitant of the particular—and indeed have that particular as its own necessary concomitant—such that both the shared and the distinctive elements are conditional upon one another? A condition need not precede what is conditional upon it.

This is how animal nature relates to rationality and the ability to neigh: each is conditional upon the other. The distinctive attribute—rationality or the ability to neigh—cannot exist without animal nature, nor can animal nature exist without some such distinctive attribute.

Saying that the shared element is conditional upon the distinctive element does not mean that it is conditional upon this particular distinctive element, but rather upon either this one or that one. Thus, considered as shared, it is conditional upon one of them without specifying which; considered in its individuation and particular determination, it is conditional upon the particular determination with which it is conjoined.