They may also be told:

This is like the necessarily existent being and the contingently existent being sharing in what is denoted by existence, while each is distinguished by what is peculiar to it. The universal necessity they share does not exist in external reality. Rather, the necessarily existent being has an existence peculiar to it, and the contingently existent being has an existence peculiar to it, just as each has a reality peculiar to it.

Likewise, if it is said that each has an essence peculiar to it, they share in what is denoted by essence, while each is distinguished from the other by what is peculiar to it. They share only in the unrestricted universal meaning, whereas each is distinguished from the other by its existence in external reality. What they share exists only in the mind, whereas what distinguishes them exists in external reality and may also be conceived in the mind. For what exists externally can be conceived in the mind, but not everything conceived in the mind exists externally. Thus, what they share does not depend on what distinguishes them, nor does what distinguishes them depend on what they share. Rather, there is no sharing among individually existing entities, nor any differentiation within unrestricted universals apprehended by the intellect—I mean with respect to their application to, and inclusion of, their individual instances. Rather, they apply uniformly to their individual instances and encompass them uniformly.

This single, encompassing meaning is like a single, encompassing general expression. Two existent beings sharing in existence, or two necessarily existent beings sharing in necessity, despite the distinctions and peculiarities between them ف in external reality, is like two colours sharing in being colours, although in external reality one is blackness and the other whiteness.