that is, the correspondence of what is in the mind to what exists externally, and of the cognitive representation to the external things it represents.

When this representation is described as universal, that is like describing a name as general. What is meant is that it corresponds to its individual instances, just as a general expression and a general meaning correspond to their individual instances ن. This correspondence is known and understood by every rational person and requires no analogy. If it is compared to the correspondence of an image in a mirror, or of a signet ring’s impression in wax, or something similar, this merely serves to illustrate it and make it easier to grasp. The reality itself, however, is already known, and every rational person knows something like this from their own experience.

Know that discussing this argument advanced by these would-be philosophers concerning the oneness of God also clarifies how to address their second argument, namely:

“If there were two necessarily existent beings that did not share in what is denoted by necessary existence, and one were distinguished from the other by something peculiar to it, then each would be composed of that which they share and that which distinguishes them. A composite depends on its constituent part and therefore cannot be necessarily existent.”

They may be answered as follows:

“They share only an abstraction in the mind. Neither shares with the other anything existing externally such that this existing thing would be composite. Each is distinguished from the other by the necessary existence peculiar to it, just as it is distinguished by its own particular reality and its own particular existence.”