not? For al-Rāzī stated that a command concerning one of the determinate instances entails that the person performing that instance is not complying. Rather, commands concerning all acts—such as prayer, zakat, fasting, pilgrimage, freeing slaves, and giving to the poor—concern something unrestricted. Nevertheless, if someone frees a slave in fulfillment of what he was commanded to do, that suffices. Likewise, fasting for two consecutive months at the beginning or middle of the year suffices, unlike fasting at its end, concerning which there is disagreement because obligatory breaks in the fast intervene. There are many such examples.

Al-Āmidī maintained that a command cannot concern a universal essence, but can only concern its particular instances. This is correct in one respect, but not in another. If what is meant is that one cannot perform an unrestricted act except as a determinate instance, and is therefore, by necessary implication, commanded to perform one unspecified particular instance, this is correct. But if what is meant is that one has been commanded only to perform a determinate instance, rather than an unrestricted act, this is incorrect.

[Al-Āmidī’s statement in al-Ihkām]

Al-Āmidī said:

“When an act is commanded in unrestricted terms, without any specific qualification in the wording, some of our colleagues say:

‘The command concerns only the shared universal essence and does not concern any of its particular instances. An example is a command to sell: it is neither a command to sell at a grossly unfair price nor at the customary market price. Both fall under the designation of selling, but differ in their attributes. The command concerns only what they have in common, which does not necessarily entail what distinguishes either of the two. Thus, it cannot be