shared by two things, then those two things must either agree in every respect, differ in every respect, or agree in one respect but not another.”

Further on, he says: “If they agree in one respect but not another, and what is denoted by ‘necessary existent’ is what they share, then what is denoted by ‘necessary existent’ must be common to both. Either what is denoted by ‘necessary existent’ is fully realized in each of the two things without that which particularizes and differentiates it, or it is not fully realized without it. The first is impossible; otherwise, the unrestricted common element would be individuated in external reality without that which particularizes it, which is impossible. The second entails that what is denoted by ‘necessary existent’ depends upon something beyond the meaning conveyed by its name, and thus would not be necessary in itself.”

I say:

They may be asked: When you say, “Either what is denoted by ‘necessary existent’ is fully realized in each of the two things without that which particularizes it,” do you mean the unrestricted, universal referent that exists only in the mind, or the referent established in external reality?

The former does not exist externally—neither in both of them nor in either one—just as the unrestricted, universal animal does not exist externally, whether in this animal or in that animal.

Rather, what exists externally is only a particular, individual animal and a particular, individual human. The same holds for the unrestricted, universal human, and likewise for all other unrestricted