in an unrestricted, universal sense, just as they share individuation in an unrestricted, universal sense. No other being shares this particular necessary existent’s particular necessity, just as none shares its particular individuation. Rather, the externally existing reality of each is itself the thing that exists externally, just as the externally existing reality of a contingent, originated being is itself what exists externally. There is no reality external to the mind apart from the particular existing thing, of which it could be said that existence is an accident or a necessary concomitant.

Rather, if the thing existing externally is among originated beings, it exists at one time and is nonexistent at another. What exists is its reality established externally, and what is nonexistent is that same reality, which is brought into being, produced, and fashioned. As for the reality conceived in the mind, that is its mental existence in knowledge. It arises through the causes that produce knowledge, just as its external reality arises through the causes that produce existence. There is nothing beyond one or the other. Thus, postulating a reality that is neither in knowledge nor in existence is postulating something that has no reality. Indeed, it is an impossible supposition conceived by the mind, just as the mind conceives what cannot exist either in knowledge or in external reality. For conceiving what cannot exist goes beyond our conceiving what does not exist. It is conceived from this general standpoint, so that a specific conception of it may be denied. Were it not distinguished in the mind in a general way, its individual instances could not be judged impossible.”

This becomes clear by examining the formulation that al-Āmidī set out for them and presented as the ultimate argument, admitting no objection. It is his statement: “If necessity of existence were