In fact, each resembles the other and agrees with it in being a particular, individuated human being.

Likewise, if we suppose two existents—one necessary and one contingent—or two existents that are both necessary or both contingent, this existent agrees with that existent in the unrestricted existence common to both, meaning that it resembles it in this respect. This one exists—that is, it has a real, established existence in external reality—and that one exists—that is, it has a real, established existence in external reality. Each differs from the other in its very existence peculiar to it, which is its essence existing in external reality. They share nothing except in external reality, whether they are alike, such as two instances of blackness or two grains of wheat, or different, such as blackness and whiteness, or a horse and a human being.

If it is said, “Blackness and whiteness, or two instances of blackness, share existence,” this is like saying, “They share actual realization and established existence, and each has a quiddity.” This does not entail that they resemble one another in any respect, for what exists in external reality for each is something peculiar to it. Thus, if they are not alike in their external existence—as with blackness and whiteness—they are not alike.

Likewise, if two necessary existents are supposed, and it is said, “They share necessity, while one is distinguished from the other by individuation,” the reply is: “There is no sharing in what exists in external reality; they share only necessity