they share an unrestricted, universal individuation and an unrestricted, universal quiddity. Each is distinguished from the other by what actually exists: its own particular existence, which is its particular reality—its very self, its essence, and its particular quiddity. The universal mental concept they share does not exist in external reality, much less require something to distinguish it. What exists in external reality is distinguished from everything else by its own self, encompassing its essence and its distinctive attributes. It requires no further distinguishing factor, even if something else resembles it or is like it.”

When it is said, “One is the same as the other,” this is with respect to species, not individual identity. This means that what exists in external reality in the one case is like what exists in external reality in the other.

Thus, if you say, “These are two human beings who share humanity, while one is distinguished from the other by its individual identity or personhood,” or use any other expression conveying this meaning, one may reply: “These two human beings share the fact that each has an individual identity peculiar to it, and each is an individual person, and so forth. They therefore share individuation and individuality, while each is distinguished from the other by the humanity peculiar to it.”