has a cause, and that its cause is either the necessity of existence—in which case it cannot be multiple—or something else, in which case the necessity of existence would be caused.

If two necessary existents are posited, and someone says, “They share the necessity of existence, but each is distinguished from the other by its individuation,” he is asked: “Do they share unrestricted necessity of existence, or does each share with the other the necessity of existence peculiar to it?” Whatever his answer, he is told: “The same applies to individuation: they share unrestricted individuation, but each is distinguished from the other by the individuation peculiar to it. If you posit unrestricted necessity, posit unrestricted individuation alongside it; and if you posit determinate necessity, posit determinate individuation alongside it.” If you say, “Unrestricted individuation exists only in the mind, not in external reality,” you are told: “Unrestricted necessity likewise exists only in the mind, not in external reality.”

As for your statement, “What they have in common is either entailed by what differentiates them, entails it, is an accidental attribute of it, or is the subject in which it inheres,” the answer is that what they have in common does not exist in external reality. Only what differentiates them exists in external reality. What you regard as common is analogous to what you regard as differentiating: either can be conceived as unrestricted or determinate.

Thus, if you say, “They share necessity, but each is distinguished from the other by its individuation,” you are told: “They share an unrestricted, universal necessity that has no existence in external reality, just as