and the other to its individuation; nor are there two existences, one corresponding to its species and the other to its individuation; nor are there two receptive entities. Rather, what exists is the particular entities we observe. The efficient cause brought about only those entities; it did not bring about unrestricted, universal species. Although these can be conceived in the mind, the discussion concerns external existence.

This makes clear to you that when a philosopher says that He—glorified and exalted be He—knows things universally rather than particularly, his claim really amounts to saying that He knows none of the things that exist. For nothing exists except determinate particulars, whereas universals exist only in knowledge. This is especially so since they say that He knows things only because He is their origin and cause, and that knowledge of the cause entails knowledge of the effect. Yet it is known that He originates determinate, individuated particulars, such as the particular celestial spheres and the particular intellects. According to their own principle, the first thing to emanate from Him is the First Intellect, which is a particular entity. Could there be any greater contradiction or corruption of reason in matters of divinity than this?

Their statement, “If an instance lacks the capacity to receive the effects of causes—namely, matter—it cannot be individuated,” is like saying, “If an instance lacks the receptive capacity—namely, matter—it cannot exist.” For its existence is nothing other than that very entity; it has no realization in external reality apart from its particular existence.

Their statement, “But if the nature of its species allows it to be predicated of many individuals, each is individuated by a cause,” is like saying, “Each exists through a cause.” It is known that whatever is contingent exists through a cause, whether its species is confined to a single individual, as with the sun, or is not confined to a single individual, as with human beings.