then if what distinguishes them is what the designation ‘Necessary Existent’ denotes, there is likewise no sharing of it. If it is something else, then what the designation ‘Necessary Existent’ denotes is shared by both. In that case, either it is fully realized in each of the two things without that which gives it its particularity and distinguishes it, or it is not fully realized without it. The first alternative is impossible; otherwise, the shared, unrestricted concept would be particularized in concrete individuals without anything to particularize it, which is impossible. The second alternative entails that it must be necessary in itself, and it has already been stated that it is necessary in itself. These impossibilities arise only from asserting that what the designation ‘Necessary Existent’ denotes is shared; hence, it cannot be shared. Thus, the Necessary Existent admits no multiplicity; rather, its species is confined to its single individual instance.”

He said: “Through sustained reflection on this carefully formulated argument and examining it for himself, the deeply learned investigator gains ever greater clarity and understanding. The lengthy doubts and various speculative objections raised against the other arguments presented in this chapter have no application here.”

This is what he says here. This argument is the one al-Āmidī related from them and from some of his own associates in his book Abkār al-Afkār. He raised two objections against it, one of which had already been raised by al-Rāzī in Sharh al-Ishārāt, namely, that