particular individuation—is due to its being the Necessary Existent, then there is no necessary existent other than it.” For necessary existence would entail that particular individuation, and what entails something cannot exist without it. Necessary existence would therefore be realized only in that individuated existent, which is what was to be established. If that individuation is not due to necessary existence, then it is caused; yet it is impossible for the Necessary Existent to be caused. This encompasses all four cases, since the individuated existent would then be a cause other than necessary existence. As he subsequently stated, things that have a definition specifying their species become multiple only through causes, and are individuated through other causes, unless their species requires that they exist as a single individual. If individuation has a cause other than necessary existence, then it is caused, just as a human being’s individuation is caused by something other than humanity.

He then explained that it would be caused under all four suppositions. He said that if the shared necessity of existence necessarily follows from individuation—that is, from this individuation and that individuation in the two necessary existents, just as humanity necessarily belongs to this human being and that human being; and this individuation in the two necessary existents is among those things to which humanity necessarily belongs in this human being and that human being—then necessary existence would be an entailment or an attribute of an essence other than itself. He has already said in the second premise that this is impossible. And if necessary existence were an entailment or an attribute of an essence other than itself—and he has already said in the second premise that this is impossible—and if it were incidental, then this would be all the more so. If it were the subject to which the attribute is incidental, he has already demonstrated its invalidity. As for the remaining cases, namely, multiple individuation necessarily following from what is shared, this would be all the more so. If it were the subject to which the attribute is incidental, he has already demonstrated its invalidity. As for the remaining cases, namely, multiple individuation necessarily following from what is shared, this is impossible in every instance, just as it is impossible for a human being’s individuation to follow necessarily from humanity. It does not follow that wherever what is shared exists, the individuated existent exists; and this is impossible.

[Al-Āmidī’s statement in al-Haqā’iq (The Realities)]

Once it is understood that this is what he means, know that this argument is formulated in various ways, while its meaning remains the same, as al-Āmidī formulated it in Daqā’iq al-Haqā’iq (The Subtleties of the Realities), in