is due to a particularity of that whose existence is necessary in itself, this is impossible. If it is incidental only after an earlier individuation, then our argument applies to that earlier individuation, and the remaining alternatives are impossible.”

I say: To clarify this argument, if two necessary existents are posited, they share what is designated by necessity, while each is distinguished from the other by its individuation. What they share must either be a necessary concomitant of what distinguishes them, have it as a necessary concomitant, be incidental to it, or be that to which it is incidental. If what they share is a necessary concomitant—as being an animal necessarily follows from being human, for example—this is inadmissible here, as he stated. For if the Necessary Existent is a necessary concomitant of its individuation, then necessary existence would be a necessary concomitant of an essence other than itself and would be an attribute. That is impossible.

If what they share, namely necessity, is incidental to what distinguishes each, namely individuation—which is the essence—then it has all the more reason to depend on a cause. Necessary existence, however, cannot depend on a cause.

If individuation is incidental to their shared necessity, then it depends on a cause, as does the individuation of the members of a species.

For this reason, he subsequently said: “Know that things sharing a single definition of their species differ only through other causes, and that if an individual among them does not possess the capacity