another attribute, for a cause is prior in existence, and nothing can be prior in existence to existence itself.”

He may be answered as follows:

This rests on the assumption that a thing’s essence is distinct from its existence. We say:

By essence and existence, you may mean essence and existence as known and conceived in the mind; or you may mean the essence existing in external reality and the existence established in external reality; or you may mean by essence what is in the mind, and by existence what is in external reality; or the reverse.

If he means the second, there is no doubt that what is in external reality is the particular existent, the particular reality, and the particular essence. There are not two things established there, one being the existent and the other its essence.

Whoever says that the nonexistent is a thing in external reality, or that essence is distinct from what exists externally—as some Mu‘tazilites and some philosophers have maintained—holds an utterly unsound view, as explained at length in its proper place.

If he means by essence what is in the mind, and by existence what is in external reality, there is no doubt that one differs from the other; the same applies in reverse. This is not something rational people dispute. However, because the term “essence” predominantly denotes mental existence, while the term “existence” predominantly denotes being established in external reality, and because one differs from the other, some have imagined that an existent has an essence distinct from the particular existent itself. This is sheer error.