Consider the general applicability of meanings and their being shared by analogy with the general applicability of words and their being shared. Thus, if you say that the word “human” is shared by this individual and that one and applies to both, and that the word “animal” is shared by more individuals than the word “human,” there is nevertheless nothing shared between the entities so designated in external reality. There is nothing in external reality shared between this human being and that human being, or between the two of them and a horse, merely because they share and agree in the words “human” and “animal.” The same applies to their agreement and sharing in the meaning signified by the word.

The same also applies to their agreement and sharing in the written form corresponding to that word. The written form corresponds to the word, and the word corresponds to the meaning. All three encompass the individuals existing in external reality and apply generally to them. The particular entities agree in and share these three, without there being anything in external reality shared between those entities. Rather, they resemble one another with respect to the meaning encompassing them, the word corresponding to that meaning, and the written form corresponding to the word.

This clarifies the discussion of the second case: that what distinguishes them necessarily accompanies what they share. This is an impossible case, for nothing exists in external reality except what distinguishes them, in the sense opposed to sharing. Nothing shared exists in external reality; rather, each thing is itself and does not share anything with another. It therefore differs from the other if difference is taken as the counterpart of sharing. As for difference understood as the counterpart of similarity ن, this may or may not exist in external reality.

Thus, two identical instances of whiteness do not differ according to this terminology, but they do differ according to the terminology