different rulings. They answer those who say that ownership is of a single kind, acquired through sale, inheritance, acceptance of gifts, and similar means, by saying that ownership comprises different kinds: one is not like another, even though they share many, many rulings. The same applies to the permissibility of shedding blood arising from apostasy, killing, and unlawful sexual intercourse.
They have been challenged with the invalidation of ablution, which results from different causes. They reply that a ruling may differ in strength and weakness.
The discussion at this point concerns the similarity of rulings and differing causes, and the similarity of the concomitants of different species. As for the fact that this particular instance is not that particular instance, there is no dispute about this.
The point here concerns things that agree in some respect. If it is said that what they share necessarily accompanies what distinguishes them, then what they share, insofar as it is shared, is not separate from what distinguishes them, nor does it exist alongside it, let alone necessarily accompany it. For it is shared only when it is in the mind, and in this respect it does not exist in external reality. Rather, saying that they share an attribute means that this attribute exists in one as a particular instance, while another particular instance of the same kind exists in the other. A particular instance is not itself shared. Thus, one must not suppose that what they share exists in external reality as something shared there, even though it is shared in the mind.