Even if it were said that this particular neighing being contains an animal, the animal within it is not the animal within which the particular neighing being is found. What, then, of the animal within a rational being and others like it?

If what he means is that the general, unqualified, or universal nature necessarily accompanies these particular natures, the correct meaning is this: the concept that exists in the mind as general, unqualified, and universal, and whose concrete instances in external reality outnumber those of the particular nature, necessarily accompanies that particular nature. Thus, wherever there is a rational being or a neighing being, there is something that is an animal. But the presence of an animal does not necessarily imply the presence of a rational being or a neighing being.

There is a question here that this is not the place to discuss: whether the animality belonging to a human being, for example, is similar to that belonging to a horse or differs from it. These thinkers say that it is similar, and that different things necessarily have similar concomitants. Others say, rather, that the concomitants of different things are themselves different, and that the animality in this species is not like the animality in the other species.

This parallels their disagreement concerning a ruling of a single kind: may it be explained by two different causes? Those who take the first view allow this. Those who take the second disallow it, saying that different causes entail