and particular; there is nothing but an entity subsisting in itself—whether called a substance, a body, or something else—or an attribute of it, whether called an accident or not.

The point is that when two things agree and share something, such as humanity or animality, yet differ and are distinguished from one another by something, such as their individuation and particularity, every respect in which they agree or differ can be considered either unqualified or particular. When considered as particular, neither shares with the other that which is particular to it. When considered as unqualified or universal, each shares with the other the unqualified universal that applies to both. Universals, however, exist in minds, while in external reality there is only what is particular and specific.

Yet particular things exhibit similarities, differences, and opposition to one another.

If someone says, “This human being shares humanity with that one but is distinguished from him by individuation,” he may be asked: “Does he share the humanity specific to that individual, or humanity without qualification?” The first is false and contradicts his statement, “but is distinguished from him by individuation.” If he means the second, he may be told: “The same applies to individuation: he shares with the other individuation without qualification. Each has an individuation specific to him, while both share individuation without qualification, just as we said concerning humanity.”

As for their statement: “Whenever things differ as individuals but agree in an essential constituent, what they share must be either a necessary concomitant of what differentiates them, something that necessarily entails it, an accidental attribute of it, or a subject bearing it. The first, third, and fourth are possible, while the second is impossible.”