requires it to be an attribute of that thing and to be predicated of it, and this is precisely qualification and particularization.

Likewise, when we say, “This is an animal,” or “This is a body,” it does not follow that an unqualified animal has come into existence, let alone a human being, a horse, or another such species, or a particular body abstracted from its being one of the particular bodies.

The expression “the unqualified without any condition” rules out making unqualifiedness a condition, for that would be “the unqualified on condition of being unqualified.” The latter does not exist in external reality, a point undisputed among these logicians, the followers of Aristotle, to whom Greek logic is attributed. Thus, they mention no disagreement on this point; only the followers of Plato affirm its existence in external reality. If unqualifiedness is not a condition, nothing prevents a qualification from accompanying it, so its existence is qualified. If its existence is qualified, it cannot be unqualified, since unqualifiedness is incompatible with qualification.

If you say, “The qualified falls within the unqualified taken without any condition,” I reply: “When it falls within it, it is identical to it in essence, though distinct from it in attributes.”

Thus, when you say, “A rational being is an animal,” there are not two substances there, one unqualified and the other qualified.

This is attested by the senses and is not disputed by anyone who conceives it. Thus, in particular existents there are only their particular attributes that subsist in them, and all of this is individuated