and union. They say that man is like Allah, and that His words,

“There is nothing like Him” (al-Shūrā: 11),

mean that nothing is like man, who is himself like Allah. They also say that the celestial sphere moves only to resemble what is above it. Thus they hold that the servant is capable of becoming like Allah, and that the celestial sphere becomes like Allah, or like the intellect that resembles Allah.

If the Torah says, “We shall create a human being in Our image, resembling Us,” or words to that effect, this amounts at most to Allah creating someone who resembles Him in some respect. Yet you have held that the servant is capable of becoming like Allah in some respect. If resemblance to Allah is invalid in every respect, and no existing thing can resemble Him in any way, then the resemblance you affirm is more objectionable than that affirmed by the People of the Book. For you have held that the servant is capable of becoming like the Lord, whereas they have stated that the Lord is capable of creating something that resembles Him.

Your position thus affirms resemblance and places it within the servant’s power, whereas they, while affirming resemblance, place it only within the Lord’s power. Which of the two parties is more deserving of condemnation and blame—you or the People of the Book—if such resemblance is an objectionable and false assertion? If it is not an objectionable and false assertion, then the People of the Book are more sound in their position than you, because they have followed the wording of the divine texts, which affirm something within the power of the Lord of creation, whereas you have introduced your innovations without any authority from Allah.

It may also be said: Any two existing things necessarily have something in common and something that distinguishes them. They must share the fact that they are existent, established, and actual, and that