And those with discernment know that the method to which he refers cannot lead to the desired end. Thus, when those who followed this path—such as Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Sabʿīn, Ibn al-Fārid, the author of Khalʿ al-Naʿlayn (Removing the Two Sandals), al-Tilimsānī, and others like them—built upon the position of the negators, they reached conclusions whose falsity is evident from reason and religion, despite claiming to be leaders of those who have attained true knowledge.

This is why you find that, in his debates with the philosophers, Abū Hāmid merely refutes their methods without establishing any particular method of his own. Rather, as he said:

“We debate them—meaning, in addition to al-Ashʿarī’s arguments—sometimes using the arguments of the Muʿtazila, sometimes those of the Karrāmiyya, and sometimes the approach of those who suspend judgment.”

It is this last approach that predominates in the final conclusions of his discussions.