Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (5/47)

has led many people to refrain from applying the term “beginningless” to both the One possessing the attribute and the attribute together, although they apply it to either when considered separately. This is the approach of Ibn Kullāb and most leading speculative theologians who affirm the attributes. The statements of Abū al-Hasan al-Tamīmī, al-Khattābī, and others who followed this approach proceed along these lines.

[Abū al-Hasan al-Tamīmī’s discussion in Jāmiʿ al-usūl]

Thus Abū al-Hasan says in his book al-Ishāra (The Indication), in Jāmiʿ al-usūl (Compendium of Fundamentals):

“Issue: If someone asks whether the attributes may be described as beginningless, the answer is: This is a poorly framed question, which no one who understands the realities of theological discourse would ask. For the beginningless, eternal One was not beginningless without attributes; rather, He was beginningless with His attributes, which belong to Him Himself. Affirming that the Beginningless One is beginningless with His attributes removes the question concerning the beginninglessness of the attributes, since an attribute belongs to the One possessing it. Thus, every attribute inherent in the Beginningless One is an attribute He has always possessed.

“Do you not see that a thing that has come into existence has done so in its entirety? If you ask about its parts separately, each part has come into existence, and everything belonging to it has come into existence, because the whole of it has come into existence in its entirety. Do you not also see that a human being has come into existence with all his limbs and faculties? When asked about him as a whole, one says, ‘He has come into existence’; when asked specifically about his hand, one says, ‘His hand has come into existence.’ But one does not say, ‘The human being and his head are two things that have come into existence.’ Likewise, one says that the Beginningless One, with all His attributes, is beginningless, and that everything belonging to the Beginningless One is beginningless and has not come into existence.

أوجب أن صار كثير من الناس يحترزون عن إطلاق لفظ القديم على الموصوف والصفة جميعاً وإن كانوا يطلقون ذلك على أحدهما عند الانفراد وهذه طريقة ابن كلاب وأكثر أئمة متكلمي الصفاتية وعلى هذا جرى كلام أبي الحسن التميمي والخطابي وغيرهما ممن سلك هذا المسلك. [كلام أبي الحسن التميمي في جامع الأصول] كما قال أبو الحسن في كتاب الإشارة له في جامع الأصول قال مسألة إن سأل سائل فقال هل يقال إن الصفات قديمة قيل له هذا سؤال ضعيف لا يسأل عنه من عرف حقائق الكلام لآن القديم الأزلي لم يكن قديماً بغير صفة وغنما كان قديماً بصفاته التي هي مضافة إليه في نفسه فإثبات القديم قديماً بصفاته يسقط المسألة عن قدم الصفات لإضافة الصفة إلى الموصوف فكل صفة للقديم في نفسه لم يزل بها ألا ترى أن المحدث جميعه محدث فإذا سألت عنه مفرقاً كانت كل طائفة منه محدثة وكل شيء منه محدث لأنه كله محدث بكماله أو لا ترى أن الإنسان محدث بجميع جوارحه وآلته فيقال هو محدث عند المسألة عنه في الجملة ويقال يده محدثة عند المسألة عنها في التفسير ولا يقال إن الإنسان ورأسه محدثان فكذلك أيضاً يقال القديم بجميع صفاته قديم وكل شيء من القديم فهو قديم غير محدث.