that determines his being knowing rather than not knowing. The Creator, exalted be He, knows all things, and it is impossible for Him not to know them; thus He has no need of an underlying quality that determines His being knowing rather than not knowing.’”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary]

Abū al-Husayn may therefore be told: Since your position, and that of those who deny states, is that each of us is knowing without an underlying quality, and that the Creator is knowing without an underlying quality, the argument of those who affirm the attributes is established. It is thus clear that affirming the attribute for one of the two knowing beings but not the other is invalid. As for the statement you cited from Abū Hāshim, it is the position of those who affirm states.

Accordingly, those who affirm both attributes and states, such as al-Qādī Abū Bakr, al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, and their followers, address him as follows: The fact that He knows, and necessarily knows, does not preclude this from entailing knowledge by virtue of which He is knowing. Rather, a necessary state entails a necessary cause, and a contingent state entails a contingent cause. The only difference between the two is that each of us knows although it is possible for him to have no knowledge and not to be knowing, whereas the Creator knows and necessarily possesses knowledge and is knowing. The difference between them therefore concerns the necessity of the attribute and the state in one case, and their contingency in the other. As for the attribute and the state being established in one but not the other—

All this makes it clear to anyone who is knowledgeable and fair-minded that Abū al-Husayn and others like him among the Mu‘tazilah cannot identify any intelligible difference between their position and that of the leading proponents of the attributes. Even supposing that they identify a difference, their argument for