and that whatever there is no way to establish may not be affirmed. The substance of his argument was thus the denial of a thing—its nonexistence in reality. Rather, the burden of proof rests upon the denier. The implication does not run in reverse: the absence of evidence for a thing does not entail its nonexistence in reality. Rather, whoever denies something must furnish evidence for its nonexistence, just as whoever affirms something must furnish evidence for its existence. Whoever has evidence for neither denial nor affirmation must neither deny nor affirm. At most, he can suspend judgment as to whether to deny or affirm it. This is illustrated by his presentation of the argument of those who affirm the attributes: each of us is knowing by virtue of an underlying quality without which he cannot be knowing; the same must therefore hold for the Creator, glorified and exalted be He.

He said: “The answer is to ask them: Why must this be the ruling concerning the Creator, glorified and exalted be He? Why do you reject the possibility that each of us is knowing by virtue of an underlying quality, whereas the Creator is knowing by virtue of His essence? Moreover, each of us is knowing without an underlying quality, even though this is not the position of Abū Hāshim’s followers. Abū Hāshim’s followers themselves distinguished between each of us and the Creator, exalted be He, in this respect. They said: ‘One of us knows, although it is possible for him not to know; hence he can be knowing only by virtue of an underlying quality