Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (5/42)

is a question that cannot be raised against them or anyone else. For if “need” is taken to mean that His possessing the attributes of perfection does not entail His being knowing and powerful, this is false. If it is said that this entails needing an attribute, that is like saying that it entails needing His essence. He is self-sufficient, having no need of anything besides Himself; it is not said that He has no need of Himself. For it is His holy essence, characterized by perfection and necessarily possessing what this entails, that is self-sufficient. Thus, saying that He has no need of this is like saying that He has no need of Himself, of His self-sufficiency, or of that without which He would not be self-sufficient. It is also like saying that the Living One, whose life is necessary, has no need of His life; that the One whose existence is necessary has no need of His existence; or that the One who has existed without beginning has no need of His beginninglessness—and other such statements.

If he says, “They say that He is knowing by virtue of knowledge, but do not say that He exists by virtue of existence, endures by virtue of endurance, or is beginningless by virtue of beginninglessness,”

he may be answered: Some of them do say this, while others do not. Those who do not distinguish between these cases as follows: if the beginningless, enduring essence itself is supposed not to be beginningless or enduring, the difference does not amount to a positive quality inhering in it. For endurance is continued existence, and if an enduring thing is supposed not to have changed, its condition is the same with or without endurance. Knowledge and power, however, are different: if the knowing, powerful essence is supposed not to be knowing or powerful, its intrinsic condition is understood to differ under that supposition. This is not merely a relation or connection, as endurance and similar descriptions are.

Furthermore, your grouping these affirmers of the attributes together with the Magians and Christians displays a prejudice that no fair-minded person could overlook.

سؤال لا يرد عليهم ولا على أحد وذلك أن معنى الحاجة إن أريد به أن اتصافه بصفات الكمال لا يستلزم كونه عالماً قادراً فهذا باطل وإذا قيل إن ذلك يتضمن الحاجة إلى صفة فهو كقول القائل إن ذلك يتضمن الحاجة إلى ذاته وهو غني بنفسه عن كل ما سواه ولا يقال هو غني عن نفسه فغن نفسه المقدسة الموصوفة بصفة الكمال المستلزمة لذلك هي الغنية فإذا قيل هو غني عن ذلك كان مثل قول القائل هو غني عن نفسه أو غني عن غناه أو غني عما لا يكون غنياً إلا به وكقوله الحي الذي تجب الحياة له غني عن حياته أو واجب الوجود غني عن وجوده والقديم عن قدمه ونحو ذلك. فإن قال هم يقولون عالم بعلم ولا يقولون موجود بوجود ولا باق ببقاء ولا قديم بقدم. قيل منهم من يقول ذلك ومنهم من لا يقول به ويفرق بأن نفس الذات القديمة الباقية إذا قدرت غير قديمة ولا باقية لم يرجع الخلاف في ذلك إلى معنى ثبتي قام بها فإن البقاء هو الدوام والشيء الباقي إذا قدر أنه لم يتغير فحاله مع البقاء ودونه سواء بخلاف العلم والقدرة فإن الذات العالمة القادرة إذا قدر أنها غير عالمة ولا قادرة علم ذلك اختلاف حالها في نفسها بتقدير عدمه ليس هو مجرد نسبة وإضافة كالبقاء ونحوه. وأيضاً فجمعك بين هؤلاء الصفاتية وبين المجوس والنصارى فيه من التحامل مالا يخفى على منصف.