alone, and at other times he is perplexed by it, despite their claim that the position they maintain is certain, demonstratively proven, and rational, admitting no contrary possibility.

This occurs frequently in questions of astronomy and other mathematical sciences, and in discussions of bodies and other subjects of natural philosophy. What, then, should one expect of metaphysics? The leading philosophers themselves claim that they cannot attain certainty in it, but speak only in terms of what is more likely, more plausible, and more fitting.

You will find most accomplished scholars versed in speculative theology and philosophy—even in Sufism—who have not thoroughly understood what the Messenger brought bewildered in this field. Thus al-Shahrastānī recited these verses at the beginning of his book, after saying:

“One whose counsel is a boon and whose command must be obeyed has asked me to compile for him those difficult questions concerning fundamental doctrines that have baffled men of reason. Perhaps he has mistaken swelling for flesh, and blown where there is no fire to kindle. By my life:

I have wandered through all those precincts,
And cast my gaze among their landmarks;
Yet found only a bewildered man, his hand upon his chin,
Or one who gnashed his teeth in regret.”

Abū Abd Allāh al-Rāzī also recited verses in several of his books, including Aqsām al-Ladhdhāt (The Kinds of Pleasure), after stating that this science is the noblest of the sciences and comprises three domains: knowledge of the Essence, the attributes, and the acts. Each domain has its own knotty problem. Knowledge of the Essence presents this difficulty: